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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes several emerging transnational regulatory systems 
that engage, but are not centered on state legal systems. Driven primarily 
by civil society organizations, the new regulatory systems use 
conventional technical standard setting and certification techniques to 
establish market-leveraged, social and environmental regulatory 
programs. These programs resemble state regulatory programs in many 
important respects, and are increasingly legalized. Individual sectors 
generally have multiple regulatory programs that compete with, but also 
mimic and reinforce each other. While forestry is the most developed 
example, similar patterns are evident in agriculture, fisheries, apparel, and 
mining, among other sectors.  
 
The paper describes the institutional structures and routines of the new 
regulatory systems, their interactions with state based systems, and some 
possible broader implications for law and society. Among other things, it 
notes that the emerging regulatory systems permeate their sectors with 
increasingly broad and deep rule systems and seek to remain highly 
dynamic at the same time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of 
whether the systems might be sketching the outlines of new forms of 
transnational democracy.  
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law, legalization, legal pluralism, mining, organic agriculture, participation, 
polyarchy, regulation, socio-legal studies, standardization, sustainable 
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1. Introduction 
Remarkable new supra-governmental, transnational regulatory systems 
are taking shape around us. Driven primarily by civil society organizations, 
but also by governments and industry associations, these systems draw 
on conventional technical standard setting and certification techniques to 
establish market-leveraged, social and environmental regulatory 
programs. They go beyond traditional standard setting, however, in 
seeking to protect interests not directly involved in the market chain. 
Moreover, these systems incorporate plural rule-making, adjudication, and 
enforcement programs. The programs constantly compete with, but also 
mimic and reinforce each other. While the most developed example is in 
forestry, similar systems are also present in agriculture, fisheries, apparel, 
and mining, among other sectors. They share the assumptions that 
enterprises around the world should be held to common standards and 
that compliance with those standards can be assured through use of 
formally independent expert auditors. The various standards, procedures, 
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and roles of the actors are generally defined in terms of formalized rules, 
rights, and duties based on normative criteria in ways very similar to those 
of state based legal systems.  
 
This paper examines forestry regulation as a central case but also draws 
parallels to the other sectors mentioned above. ‘Regulation’ here means 
simply a purposive, organized and sustained effort to establish a general 
and consistent order in a field of human activity (e.g., Black 2002). Since it 
typically centers on rules defined in terms of rights and duties, with 
differentiated official roles and normative justifications, regulation is a form 
of law, but one that is characterized by a reliance on credentialed experts 
who are expected to manage a field and to learn and adapt based on 
experience.  
 
This paper first describes the forest certification regulatory system and the 
process by which it has been established (Section 2), next discusses its 
relationship to state governance systems (Section 3), makes some 
comparisons to other sectors (Section 4), and finally considers the impacts 
(Section 5) and possible broader implications for law and society (Section 
6) of certification-centered transnational regulatory systems. Overall, it 
describes a set of multi-centered, competitive regulatory systems that are 
increasingly rule-permeated and changeable at the same time. The paper 
closes with a brief discussion of whether these systems might be 
sketching the outlines of new forms of transnational democracy.  
 
2. Forest Certification 
Forest certification was instituted by a loose-knit group of extra-
governmental ‘regulatory entrepreneurs’ (see Meidinger 1985) in response 
to the failure of the Westphalian system to curb rapid tropical forest 
destruction, a process that came to be understood as reaching crisis 
dimensions in the 1980s (Humphreys 1996; Gale 1998). While there are 
multiple reasons for tropical deforestation, a major one has been the 
burgeoning importation of tropical timber by developed countries wanting 
cheap wood (Brown 2001).  
 
Exasperated with the failure of intergovernmental negotiations to 
effectively address the problems of tropical ecosystem destruction and 
biodiversity loss, some Northern environmental groups pursued a tropical 
timber boycott, but dropped it when its potentially perverse consequences 
of hurting proper tropical forest management and possibly speeding 
agricultural conversion because of the decreased economic value of 
forests became apparent. As an alternative, they tried to get the 
intergovernmental system, via the International Tropical Timber 
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Organization (ITTO), to establish a system for certifying sustainably 
produced timber so that it could be distinguished and rewarded in 
international markets. The idea was to convert the rapidly growing global 
timber market into an engine of forest preservation, rather than 
destruction. The ITTO, which consists of approximately 40 of the largest 
tropical timber exporting and importing countries, refused to establish such 
a system. Several Southern exporting countries evidently saw it as a 
potential non-tariff barrier to trade in that northern environmental groups 
might call for boycotts of non-certified timber.  
 
As early as 1989 the non-profit US-based Rainforest Alliance established 
its own program for certifying sustainable tropical timber – ‘SmartWood’. 
While many of the larger environmental groups continued to pursue 
intergovernmental regulatory solutions, they also began laying plans for 
what they saw as the distinctly inferior option of establishing a free-
standing non-governmental forest certification system. After the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio failed to 
achieve a binding forest convention these plans were put into motion with 
the 1993 founding of the Forest Stewardship Council.  
 
The FSC  
Although discussions of creating an umbrella forest certification system 
went back at least to 1990, the FSC faced a daunting set of challenges. 
As suggested above, the FSC was founded by a small progressive 
coalition of transnational environmental NGOs – primarily the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace – together some high end wood 
buyers, progressive foresters, and social activists. Most of the major 
powers in forestry at the time were absent and many were hostile. 
Moreover, nothing like a global system for certifying forest management 
practices had ever been attempted. On the other hand, the standard 
institutional methods of technical standard setting and certification were 
available. So too were a professional forestry credo laying out the basic 
elements of proper forestry and an emerging discourse of sustainable 
development stressing a the interdependence of economic development, 
environmental protection and social justice and the importance of using 
participatory policy mechanisms. Moreover, forestry had long been a 
relatively self-governing industry and had developed reasonably effective 
methods of imposing ‘sustained yield’ forestry in most developed 
countries, although these had recently been shown to leave out key 
environmental and social concerns in many cases.  
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia  Draft 2.2 
  Page 5 of 30 
Standard Setting  
The FSC is constituted as a global, non-governmental, multi-stakeholder 
organization, reflecting the ascendant canon that effective organizations 
must incorporate the voices of all interests relevant to their missions. It is 
governed by a ‘General Assembly’ organized in three chambers, 
environmental, social, and economic, each with equal voting power (see 
generally FSC 2006). The chambers are further subdivided into ‘Northern’ 
and ‘Southern’ sub-chambers, again with equal voting power, to 
counterbalance the relative overrepresentation of northern interests. Day 
to day management is delegated to an Executive Director who works in 
close collaboration with a nine-member elected Board of Directors. 
Membership in the FSC is open to all organizations and individuals who 
subscribe to FSC’s mission (providing responsible management of the 
worlds forests) and are endorsed by two existing members.  
 
Shortly after its founding the FSC promulgated a set of ‘principles and 
criteria’ (P&C) intended to govern proper forest management worldwide. 
Bringing together tenets from forestry, environmental, and human rights 
discourses, the P&C require compliance with applicable laws and treaties, 
clear and adequate property rights, protection of indigenous, community, 
and worker rights, full and efficient use of forest resources, and fairly 
stringent environmental protection, among other things. These 
requirements have been revised in limited ways over time and are given 
further place-appropriate content in national and regional standard setting 
processes.  
Certification and Accreditation  
Much of the FSC’s early work focused on accrediting and overseeing the 
certification organizations whose job it is to ascertain and publicly verify 
that certified companies in fact comply with the P&C as well as any 
applicable national or regional standards. While certification organizations 
are formally independent of the FSC, the quality of their work and their 
public credibility are crucial to the success of the FSC program. A typical 
FSC certification process includes, among other things, (1) an intensive 
site visit by a team of certifiers possessing forest management, 
environmental, and social expertise and seeking to ascertain compliance 
with the full array of applicable standards (but with latitude to grant 
certification despite minor shortcomings), (2) consultations with local 
stakeholders, (3) preparation of a draft report which is subjected to peer 
review by two or three external experts, (4) discussion of possible terms of 
the certification with the applicant, including possible pre-conditions or 
corrective actions to be taken within a specified amount of time, (5) an 
official certification decision including final preconditions or corrective 
action requirements, (6) a public summary of the decision containing 
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia  Draft 2.2 
  Page 6 of 30 
‘sufficient information to make clear the correlation between the specific 
results of the certification assessment and FSC principles’, (7) annual 
audits, and (8) a full review for possible renewal every five years.  
 
Certifiers thus combine the traditional public law functions of 
administrative inspection and adjudication, but their services are paid for 
by the by the applicants for certification. The risks of corruption posed by 
this arrangement do not seem to have been a major concern of the FSC 
system early on, evidently because of the faith in professionalism that 
characterizes the forestry sector and the assumption that, if anything, 
certifiers were likely to be too tough in doing the bidding of what was 
perceived to be a zealous certification program. Nonetheless, the FSC set 
up a system for auditing certification decisions and has suspended the 
accreditation of certifiers on a few occasions. Over time the accreditation 
and auditing program has become more formalized, and it was recently 
made financially independent of the FSC.  
Labeling  
The FSC also developed standards for certifying the ‘chain of custody’ of 
certified products. The original goal was to be able to prove that the wood 
in any product carrying the FSC logo actually came from a certified forest. 
This can be quite complicated in the highly differentiated, multi-supplier, 
long distance, high volume, and low margin markets that characterize the 
modern forestry sector. Over time the FSC certified content requirements 
have become considerably looser, allowing certain products to carry the 
logo based on a set percentage of FSC content. 
Enforcement 
While the FSC certification program was initially scorned or ignored by 
most established forestry powers, it soon came to be perceived as a force 
to be reckoned with. One of the most important reasons was a series of 
campaigns by environmental activists to pressure major wood products 
retailers to commit to buying FSC certified wood. British do-it-yourself 
retailer B&Q quickly welcomed the FSC as a way of responding to activist 
criticisms of its purchasing policies that predated the FSC’s founding. 
American retailer Home Depot joined after several hundred well publicized 
actions by the Rainforest Action Network (RAN) in its parking lots and 
stores threatening to associate the Home Depot brand with rainforest 
destruction (e.g. Sasser 2002). By thus focusing on key retailer links in the 
extended global forest product chain activist groups were able to use 
market relationships to leverage the FSC into an important new role in 
forest governance. Leveraging market chains has become a primary 
enforcement mechanism, although the official mechanisms include 
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unannounced inspections, random auditing, and potential loss of 
certificates.  
 
Industry Based Programs  
Although surprised and often offended by the rise of the FSC, many 
traditional forestry interests responded quickly. North American industry 
groups in particular were already worried about their declining public 
image and promptly decided to establish their own forest certification 
programs, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) in the US and the 
Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Forest Management standard in 
Canada (see generally Cashore et al 2003). Program details and histories 
are too complex to be recounted here, but the broad outlines are clear. 
Both initiatives sought to develop programs that were acceptable to the 
public but minimally onerous to industry. The SFI was established by the 
largest forest products association in the US, the American Forest & 
Paper Association (AF&PA), on its own motion. The CSA was established 
by the Canadian national technical standard setting body in cooperation 
with the Canadian forest products industry.  
Management Systems 
Although there were many differences between the programs, they both 
favored the ‘environmental management system’ (EMS) approach that 
had recently been developed by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) in its ISO 14000 series of standards (ISO 2006). 
This approach relies on ‘installing’ an EMS in the firm which provides 
mechanisms to (1) assess the environmental aspects of the firm’s 
operations, (2) plan which ones to improve and how, (3) set measurable 
goals for improvement, and (4) assign responsibilities for implementing, 
monitoring, correcting failures, and revising plans to specific individuals. In 
addition, flowing from the ‘total quality management’ movement of the 
1980s, the EMS approach requires ‘continuous improvement’ in the 
management system. Its stress on fully assessing the environmental 
aspects of the firm’s activities expands upon the ‘environmental impact 
assessment’ concept originally developed for public environmental 
management, and may be particularly important for firms operating in 
unfamiliar environments, as is often the case for global corporations.  
 
The EMS approach differs from the ‘performance standard’ 
approach adopted by the FSC in that the firm, rather than the 
external standard setting organization, is primarily responsible for 
setting its goals. Moreover, what is audited is the presence of 
management programs to pursue those goals rather than their 
achievement. The management systems themselves seem to 
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involve an intensification of internal rules, since auditors generally 
for documentation of procedures and responsibilities, and for 
documentary evidence that they are being carried out.  
Federation  
Industry based programs were also established in a variety of other 
countries, including the major exporters of Malaysia, Brazil and 
Indonesia. With the partial exception of the Indonesian program, 
which is coordinated with the FSC, they all tended to see 
themselves in opposition to the FSC, which they perceived as too 
environmentalist dominated and stringent. In 1998-1999 a Europe-
wide federation of forest certification programs was established. 
The Pan-European Forest Certification Council (PEFC) defined 
itself not as promulgating a single standard to be deployed world-
wide, but rather as providing a common framework for the mutual 
recognition of nationally based certification programs operating to 
verify the sustainable forest management practices that were 
believed already to exist in most European countries. Institutionally 
and conceptually, it drew heavily on the experiences of the existing 
certification programs as well as criteria and indicators that had 
been produced by intergovernmental processes such as a series of 
Ministerial Conferences on the Protection of Forests in Europe that 
started in 1990 and continue to the present.  
 
In 2003, PEFC went global, renaming itself the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification. It currently includes 32 
nationally based programs, of which 22 have been officially 
endorsed (PEFC 2006). Although they vary considerably, PEFC 
programs tend to be more lenient than FSC ones, not only in terms 
of standards, but also in terms of inspection and chain of custody 
requirements. They thus tend to be less expensive to participate in 
and appeal particularly to smaller land owners.  
 
Convergence, Competition and Recentered Governance   
The field of forest certification thus centers around two primary alliances. 
On one side is the FSC with its orientation to relatively uniform 
performance standards, including environmental and social concerns, 
providing for low discretion on the part of firms and certifiers and a high 
degree of multi-stakeholder control. On the other is the PEFC alliance, 
with its preference for procedurally oriented management system 
standards, focused primarily on locally defined best forestry practices, 
high discretion, and a high degree of landowner and business control. And 
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yet, the systems have also developed a growing number of similarities 
over time.  
Standards  
There have been numerous and almost continuous changes in standards, 
particularly in the PEFC programs as they seek to compete more 
effectively in the broader field of certification. Thus, the categories and 
language of standards have converged in numerous ways. While much of 
this change has involved gradual ‘ratcheting up’ (Fung et al 2001, 
Overdevest 2004) by PEFC members of their environmental standards 
and occasional addition of social ones, a certain amount has also involved 
concessions by the FSC to make its program more workable in the face of 
market challenges. A good example is the adoption of the ‘percentage 
claims’ policy discussed above. The FSC is also working on streamlined 
standards for ‘small and low intensity forests’ (SLIMFS) to reduce costs for 
small and low income enterprises.  
 
While their standards have come to resemble each other more closely, the 
different programs are still locked in debates and contests regarding 
appropriate standards for a number of controversial issues, such as 
allowable levels of clear cutting, use of pesticides and genetically modified 
organisms, duties to communities and workers, and the availability of 
certification information to the public. These are manifested through their 
contending systems of rules and procedures.  
Procedures and Roles  
There has also been considerable convergence on appropriate practices 
and procedures among the programs. Indeed, since they are essentially 
extra-governmental regulatory systems, it is not surprising that they have 
focused a great deal on administrative law questions – i.e., general rules 
for rule making, adjudication, and information gathering and sharing (see 
generally, Meidinger 2006). On the whole, the programs have 
concentrated on their standard setting processes, gradually making them 
more transparent and participatory. Today they all appear to follow notice 
and comment procedures similar to administrative agencies in most 
modern states. Certification programs also increasingly acknowledge 
duties to respond to public comments and to explain their policies in 
reasoned ways. Additionally, all of the programs are trying to demonstrate 
participation by diverse interests in their deliberations. The FSC has gone 
much farther in this regard than most industry programs, which typically 
seek to maintain industry control over policy making, but even the industry 
programs acknowledge a need for broad-based stakeholder participation 
and seek to foster it in various ways.  
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Similarly, much effort has gone into defining appropriate standards, 
procedures, and accountability structures for certifiers. The programs 
differ on how certifiers ought to be accredited (with most PEFC programs 
relying on generalized ISO accreditation agencies and the FSC relying on 
a program it originally created and later spun off), but they all stress the 
professionalism and ostensible independence of certifiers and increasingly 
seek to provide formal auditing systems for certifier decisions. Moreover, 
following the FSC, the programs are beginning to require that certifiers 
publish public summaries of their findings, thereby subjecting 
administrative adjudications as well as rulemakings to public scrutiny. The 
FSC also requires stakeholder consultations as part of the certification 
process; the PEFC programs sometimes do, but not always.  Hence, while 
the certification programs stress the importance of defined roles and 
procedures, they have also blurred the social boundaries between 
administrators and the public by providing for increased participation, 
transparency, and responsiveness in rulemaking and adjudication 
procedures. They thus manifest the dual reliance on expertise and 
participation that characterizes many Western state regulatory programs 
today.  
 
Equally importantly, forest certification programs have blurred the 
boundaries between regulatory programs and firms, both by giving firms a 
larger official role in defining regulatory standards and by using internal 
control systems (EMSs) to harness the firms to regulatory goals. This 
approach no longer treats the firm as a black box responsible simply for 
producing certain outputs, but rather as part of the regulatory program, 
with its own organizational and technological resources that can be 
committed to defining, implementing, and revising regulatory goals (Parker 
2000; Coglianese and Nash 2001, Potoski and Prakash 2005, 
Vandenbergh 2005). In practice, the EMS approach also seems to have 
the effect of further ‘legalizing’ forest management operations internally, 
since certifiers demand to see detailed documentation of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and correction processes and responsibilities.  
Network Organization  
Together, the forest certification programs have consolidated extensive 
transnational alliances into complex interconnected networks of market 
participants, environmental and social activists, forestry and certification 
professionals, and many others (including government officials, as 
discussed in the next section). These networks have been growing over 
time and also contending with each other about questions such as the 
appropriate level of centralization and the nature and role of nodes.  
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The FSC arguably initiated this process by bringing environmental, labor, 
human and indigenous rights groups and others into what had originally 
been a rather closed circle of professional foresters and landowners or 
managers. It continues to try to expand its network through strategies 
such as attempting to appeal to more small landholders and small 
enterprises through program changes and trying to strengthen its alliances 
with similar interests in other economic sectors. One of the most important 
steps in this latter process has been its participation in the International 
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance, which also 
includes low wage labor, organic agriculture, fisheries, and other labeling 
programs.  
 
Overall, the establishment of the nationally-federated PEFC together with 
the growing reach and complexity of the FSC have prompted the FSC to 
move toward decentralization. It has established regional offices and is 
increasingly focusing on national programs as its fundamental elements 
(although this strategy remains subject to debate by those who think that 
the FSC should represent an emerging transnational public, rather than 
agglomeration of national ones). At the same time, the FSC increasingly 
sees itself not as a free-standing program, but rather as part of the larger 
emerging global forest certification and governance system. Its executive 
director describes FSC’s role as being ‘a global pacesetter for 
development of standards and certification’ (Leideker 2003).  
 
In sum, while competition among the alternative certification programs 
originally seemed to imply the fragmentation, and possibly the 
disintegration of forest certification, that has not occurred. The programs 
have moved into various kinds of complex linkages as a part of their 
competition. Formerly hostile groups, particularly professional foresters 
and land owners, have been turned from outright opponents of forest 
certification, to proponents, but of their own programs. This inevitably put 
them in dialogue and mutual surveillance with the FSC program, and 
seems to have begun a process of investing them in the forest certification 
system as a whole. Most participants in the certification system seem to 
be aware that they have developed a considerable amount of mutual 
interdependence. They all have an investment in the value and validity of 
certification, and they understand that they will realize some of their goals 
through their competitors. The proliferation of forest certification has thus 
helped to consolidate a multi-interest global network engaged in 
discussions, debates, and institutional competition over appropriate 
standards and methods for forestry regulation. If this network persists it 
may constitute an important new type of global regulatory community over 
time.  
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Legalization  
As the above sections make clear, the field of forest certification is 
strikingly ‘legalized’. This term has several salient features here. The first 
is a heavy reliance on formal rules and definitions of roles. Important 
issues are routinely resolved and memorialized in rules and decisions. 
Participants almost universally seek to draw on principles, standards, and 
rules to define the rights and duties of different kinds of actors, organize 
their behavior as a whole, and resolve disputes. Most rules and policies 
are enunciated in formalized procedures and justified in normative terms. 
Much debate takes place in terms of what constitutes good forest 
management and a proper allocation of authority, but this debate takes 
place in the form of contending, heavily legalized regulatory systems. 
Certification programs have formally differentiated legislative, adjudicative, 
and administrative authorities, and are giving increasing care to how those 
authorities are defined, exercised, monitored, and revised. As noted 
above, the process of legalization is producing a system-wide body of 
public law stressing public notice and comment proceedings, publicly 
accessible policies and decisions, participatory procedures and structures, 
and reasoned explanation. At the same time, it is also producing an 
extensive body of ‘private’ law in forest management firms and trading 
networks, detailing multiple plans, procedures, duties, etc., and linking 
them back to external requirements, although, as noted above, there is a 
tug of war between external and internal legalization.  
 
Why legal forms are being so broadly and rapidly extended is unclear. It 
could be partly a kind of institutional isomorphism. Since other regulatory 
and certification programs typically take these forms, forest certification 
programs simply choose to do the same. Or it could be more functional. It 
is possible that legalization is the best way to achieve the goals of 
maintaining transnational markets while protecting environmental and 
social values. Moreover, it could be desirable in part because other 
programs with this form are seen as legitimate, thus helping to legitimate 
the new ones (Zablowski 2006). What is clear is that the process is 
widespread and probably accelerating.  
 
The concept of legalization as used thus far is similar to that of Abbott, et 
al (2000), except that it is more dynamic and contested. Legalization is not 
simply a set pattern of institutional characteristics, but also a process of 
contestation. Here it is helpful to note a further, largely taken-for-granted 
dimension of legalization in this field – which is that the transnational 
certification system draws many activities that were previously understood 
as discretionary, or otherwise outside law, into in the realm of law. Thus, 
although there are plural legal systems and considerable debate and 
competition about which rules and whose rules will apply to any given 
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activity, rules will indeed apply. These rules will in turn continue to be 
elaborated and while serving as resources for political contestation. 
Legalization can thus be understood a strategy for gaining governance 
capacity.  
 
Finally, it is important to note two additional characteristics of legalization 
in this field. First, it is very broad and deep, seeking to integrate 
environmental, economic, and social goals and to link local, national, and 
transnational domains, as well as civil society, industry, and state 
organizations. Thus, although there are plural, competing legal systems, 
together they have great ambitions and increasing reach. Second, the 
emerging systems are not inherently separate or distinct from state-based 
law. In fact, as the next section indicates, they are becoming increasingly 
intertwined with state law.  
 
 
3. Relationships to State Governance  
Just as environmentalist-oriented and industry-oriented certification 
programs appear to be growing together into a larger system, so too does 
forest certification seem to be growing together with state regulatory and 
management programs, albeit more slowly and sporadically. The FSC 
program, although formally independent of states, has as its first principle 
that forest management operations ‘shall respect all applicable laws of the 
country in which they occur, and international treaties and agreements to 
which the country is a signatory. . .’ Thus, forest certification can be seen 
as a way of both bolstering state based legal systems and also drawing 
upon their legitimacy.  
Proprietary Activities 
Forest certification has received various kinds of direct resource support 
from governments. The FSC, for example, received early funding from 
Austria and later from the Netherlands and several other EU countries 
(most recently rent-free offices in Bonn for 25 years). Several European 
countries and numerous municipalities have adopted green procurement 
policies roughly tracking FSC requirements (Tarasofsky et al 2005). These 
have prompted the PEFC to change some requirements to make its 
products eligible for government purchase. So popular and controversial 
are these procurement programs that the EU is currently working on a 
policy regarding appropriate rules for government forest products 
procurement.  
 
Interestingly, a growing number of states, provinces, and municipalities 
(ranging from Poland to Minnesota to Freiburg, Germany) have had their 
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own forests certified. In most cases they do this not in response to 
allegations that the state forests are failing to meet legal requirements, but 
rather to demonstrate that government-run forests meet the highest public 
standards, implicitly acknowledging that governments no longer claim to 
be the sole arbiters of public duties and legitimacy (see also Scott 2002).  
Regulatory Activities 
Some governments are also taking advantage of certification programs in 
regulating non-state entities. A few (e.g., Guatemala for the Maya 
Bioreserve) have made certification a requirement of conducting forestry 
in their jurisdictions. Others (e.g., Bolivia and Estonia) have adopted 
substantive requirements that are essentially identical to those of 
certification programs. Typically, this seems to have occurred because the 
public deliberations on certification standards have directly influenced 
contemporaneous public deliberations on state standards. When 
standards are identical or even very similar, it is apparent that certification 
of a firm can be seen as tantamount to compliance with law. This would 
also be the case when a certification standard is stricter, but requires 
compliance with state law and treaties, as is the case with the FSC. Some 
countries have officially adopted the position that certification of a firm 
creates a presumption of legal compliance. Given the costs of conducting 
inspections, it seems likely that other countries will follow it implicitly (see 
generally, Meidinger forthcoming).  
 
Certification programs are also trying to position themselves to shape 
state regulatory requirements in the future. International trade law requires 
WTO members to use recognized international standards in adopting 
internal technical regulations and standards applicable to internationally 
traded goods.1 Over time it seems likely that international trade law will 
promote the absorption of certification standards into state legal systems. 
  
Certification standards are also likely to be pulled into state legal systems 
indirectly through such channels as tort standards for reasonable care and 
administrative expectations of best practices as interpreted by inspectors. 
These are slow, and sometimes empirically intricate processes, however, 
and no substantial research seems to have addressed them to date. 
 
Finally, certification programs are closely interconnected with a recent 
intergovernmental initiative to fight illegal logging in tropical countries. 
Spurred by a 1998 G-8 Summit calling for governments to join forces in 
dealing with the problem, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and 
Trade Action Plan (FLEGT -- a European program), and other similar 
regional and bilateral programs, seek to eliminate access to developed 
                                            
1 E.g., Article 2.2, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement.  
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markets of legally produced timber. Thus timber imported from threatened 
forests must be certified as legal, and existing forest certification programs 
offer a way of both providing such certification and possibly leveraging 
improved forest management generally.  
 
At a broad scale, it is arguable that the certification programs are giving 
shape to a new transnational forest regulatory and governance regime, 
one that is centered in the competition among certification programs, but 
also involves continuing monitoring and participation by governments, 
corporations, and NGOs at the transnational, national, and local levels. 
The emerging regime centers on plural and competing, yet 
interconnected, systems of rules and duties, draws in and yet requires 
changes in state legal systems, and thus both strengthens and threatens 
to displace them, depending on the particular situation.  
 
4. Other Sectors  
The analysis thus far has concentrated on forestry, begging the question 
whether the competitive legalizatation that it describes is exceptional or 
more general. This question is not easy to answer at this stage, both 
because developments in every sector are highly complex and because 
relatively little research along the lines outlined above has been carried 
out. This paper therefore makes some tentative comparisons with other 
sectors that are necessarily subject to great elaboration and revision in the 
future.  
Organic Agriculture  
Organic agriculture certification was a direct precursor of forest 
certification, since some of the FSC founders had prior experience with 
organic certification. Like the FSC, the organic agriculture movement had 
its roots in efforts to reform natural resource management – in this case 
stopping the use of chemical pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers, 
avoiding monocultures, protecting ecological systems, and generally 
keeping people and animals healthier (Conford 2001). Unlike forest 
certification, however, this movement was premised on a belief that 
adherence to its principles would directly benefit end consumers, since 
organically grown foods were believed to be healthier and safer. Thus, it fit 
better with traditional standard setting and certification processes, which 
are also premised on the belief that certified products will perform better 
than uncertified ones. Still, it was partly a moral and ethical movement 
aimed at defining a right way of living.  
 
While the history of the organic agriculture is far too complicated to 
summarize here, it can be roughly sketched in several phases. In the first 
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half of the 20th century reformers developed the rationale for organic 
agriculture and founded various model farms and communities. In the 
1960s and 1970s these foundations combined with several chemical 
scares and the environmental movement to catalyze the first organic 
certification movement. Interestingly, although a German program dated 
from the 1920s (Coleman and Reed, this volume), most non-governmental 
certification programs were founded almost simultaneously at the state 
and international levels. Thus, organic certification programs in California, 
Oregon and Washington were immediately complemented by the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), 
although IFOAM only managed to promulgate its first standards in 1980 
(Bolster 2006).  
 
Organic certification in the US has long been a competitive field, and 
practices evidently have varied greatly among certifiers and jurisdictions. 
IFOAM finally launched an accreditation program in 1992, but by this time 
many certifiers had established business and chose not to seek IFOAM 
accreditation. Certification schemes and organizations proliferated, 
creating an increasingly complex and inconsistent patchwork that came to 
be understood as a significant problem.  
 
This ‘tower of Babel’ paved the way for the US Organic Foods Production 
Act (OFPA) in 1990.2 While mandating national standards for organic 
agriculture certification, the OFPA failed to define ‘organic’, leaving it to 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) working with a non-
governmental advisory committee, the National Organic Standards Board 
(NOSB). The Act also requires that any food carrying the label ‘organic’ be 
certified as such by an organization that has undergone accreditation by a 
division of the USDA, rather than the IFOAM affiliated International 
Organic Accreditation Service. Most of the accredited certifiers are private 
organizations, although some are states and some are based in foreign 
countries (Coleman and Reed, this volume).  
 
Overall, the standards promulgated through the US regulatory system 
tend to be lenient. The USDA has sided with large-scale agriculture and 
overridden a number of NOSB recommendations by allowing the use of 
genetically engineered crops, application of sewage sludge to crops, and 
use of irradiation in producing foods that can be labeled ‘organic’ (Bolster 
1996). Moreover, the US standard does not require ecological practices 
beyond limitations on ingredients and entirely ignores concerns about the 
treatment animals.  
 
                                            
2 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-624, Title XXI, Organic 
Food Production Act, 104 Stat. 3359, 3937 (1990), 7 U.S.C. § 6501-6523.  
Meidinger, Beyond Westphalia  Draft 2.2 
  Page 17 of 30 
Perhaps the most portentous effect of the federal program is to 
preemptively define the meaning of ‘organic’ in US commerce – including 
for imported foods – at a relatively low level. Farmers are free to exceed 
the standard if they wish, and states or other programs may set stricter 
standards, but they are forced to use additional labels or information to 
communicate that fact. Similar patterns are evident internationally, where 
a number of major national governments have largely ignored central 
elements of the IFOAM standards, and even those of countries they trade 
with, in promulgating their own. IFOAM is currently working on a major 
revision of its standard, with the hope that it can shape the development of 
future governmental and other standards by leading the way in defining 
core principles and concepts. It will be an interesting test of the 
transnational regulatory system to see whether and how well governments 
respond to this IFOAM initiative and to each other’s standards. 
International trade law may provide at least some positive incentive to do 
so, since it prohibits technical requirements for internationally traded 
products that are ‘unnecessary obstacles to trade’ or ‘more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective’ and also enjoins 
governments to use recognized international standards when possible.3  
Fisheries  
Although fisheries comprise a large part of the earth’s surface, the social 
world of fisheries regulation is considerably smaller than that of agriculture 
regulation. Most ocean fisheries have long been in decline due to heavy 
fishing pressure and deteriorating environmental conditions. In 1997 WWF 
joined with Unilever, one of the world’s largest buyers of fish, to establish 
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). Modeled in large part on the FSC, 
the MSC defines itself as ‘an independent, global, non-profit organization 
whose role is to recognize, via a certification program, well-managed 
fisheries and to harness consumer preference for seafood products 
bearing the MSC label of approval’. The MSC standards are largely 
environmental and operational, omitting social issues. The MSC has 
accredited a small group of certification organizations, some of which 
concentrate on fisheries and others on market chains carrying certified 
fish. Approximately eighteen fisheries have been certified to date, with a 
similar number under consideration.  
 
In certifying whole fisheries the MSC is in part certifying governments, 
since their cooperation and effective enforcement is essential to curbing 
the tragedy of the commons that typically affects fisheries. Although it 
provides for public comment and participation in standard setting and 
certification processes, the MSC has a much more limited stakeholder 
structure than either the FSC or IFOAM, and seems to operate on a more 
                                            
3 Article 2.2, TBT Agreement. 
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technocratic basis. Its influence on world fisheries governance is more 
preliminary and unclear as well. But at this point it seems plausible that 
the MSC process could eventually stimulate the production of relatively 
widely accepted standards and procedures for certifying sustainable 
fisheries – provided of course that certified fisheries in fact prove 
sustainable.  
Apparel  
Global apparel markets have long been seen both as exacerbating 
mistreatment of third-world workers and as offering a possible way to 
improve their conditions by making revenues contingent on proper 
treatment of workers. The 1980s brought a flurry of corporate codes of 
conduct by branded companies in response to highly publicized cases of 
worker abuse tied to their brands. These were often linked to actual or 
threatened consumer boycotts. In the late 1990s three separate apparel 
certification programs were founded, mainly with the goal of improving the 
consistency and implementation of codes of conduct. Two of them, Social 
Accountability International (SAI) and the Fair Labor Association (FLA), 
were primarily the offspring of NGOS and governments, while the third, 
Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), was founded by the 
industry (Bartley 2003). SAI and WRAP certify individual factories, 
whereas FLA certifies entire supply chains. Competition among the 
programs has been intense and contentious at times.  
 
The apparel certification programs have been able to draw on labor 
standards developed by governments and intergovernmental 
organizations, mainly the UN-based International Labor Organization 
(ILO). Still, a high level of contention about proper standards persists. As 
in organic certification, there is considerable disagreement among 
governments, and between governments and certification programs. Most 
governments of third world countries have been anxious not to be seen as 
havens for labor abuse, but also not to be forced into strict labor standards 
that might reduce their comparative advantage in this highly price-
competitive and volatile industry. These complexities combined with the 
inherent difficulty of regulating labor conditions in far-flung and rapidly 
rotating factories make it clear that achieving effective global governance 
over labor conditions in apparel production will be enormously difficult.  
While the certification programs have led to notable improvements in 
particular cases, it is difficult to document widespread effects. 
Nonetheless, one school of thought strongly argues that the presence of 
certification programs has helped to ‘ratchet up’ worldwide labor standards 
generally, and it does seem plausible that the overall labor situation would 
be even worse without apparel certification programs (Fung et al 2001).  
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Mining  
Mining is one of the most intriguing sectors in which regulation by 
certification has been attempted. Particularly in developing countries, the 
mining industry has a reputation for being exploitive in the fullest sense of 
the word. And yet, this dubious reputation has also been a source of 
regulatory leverage in the global market, as mining companies seek to 
avoid campaigns like the recent one against ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds. 
Mining certification began in the African diamond industry, after several 
NGOs demonstrated that rebel groups were using revenues from diamond 
mines to fuel brutal civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Congo 
(Campbell 2002). In the ‘Kimberley Process’ they were able to cooperate 
with business interests (mainly the virtual monopolist, DeBeers) and 
governments to establish a program for certifying diamonds as not having 
helped to finance civil wars (Kimberly Process). The process took about 
three years and seems to have produced a well functioning certification 
program. DeBeers used its virtually unique expertise to work out many of 
the operational details of the program and the main NGO involved (Global 
Watch) was able to successfully push for external auditing (Kantz 2006). 
The governments directly affected were very supportive of the program 
because it helped reduce rebel activity and challenges to their authority.  
 
Since the Kimberly Process Certification Program was created to address 
a specific, relatively narrow problem, the question remains whether 
certification programs can be instituted to address the larger challenges of 
environmental and community protection posed by mining. At present the 
sector involves a hodgepodge of individual company codes of conduct 
(e.g., Newmont Mining 2006), limited subsector initiatives (e.g., CRPP 
2006), and proposals for sector-wide certification programs (e.g., MCEP 
2006). The most important of the sector-wide proposals, the WWF-
supported Mining Certification Evaluation Project (MCEP 2006), concludes 
that there is enough convergence in the various initiatives to support the 
establishment of an industry-wide third-party certification program 
involving broad stakeholder participation and covering environmental, 
human rights, worker health and safety and community issues, among 
others. Whether such a program is created remains to be seen, but if it is, 
it may be a quite remarkable extension on all that has come before it.  
 
5. Impacts 
The first question commonly raised about regulatory systems like the ones 
described above is how effective they can be. They rely primarily on ‘soft’ 
law rules and quasi-voluntary implementation structures, meaning that 
states play a relatively small role in making and enforcing the rules. Thus, 
if certification-centered regulation is effective, the primary mechanisms are 
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not likely to be those associated with state-based legal systems. While it is 
too early to draw strong conclusions on the question of efficacy, there is a 
growing body of research suggesting that certification has significant 
effects on management practices as well as larger governance structures, 
certainly in the case of forestry (Bass et al 2001; Cashore et al 2006),  
probably in the cases of organic agriculture (e.g., Allen and Kovach 2000; 
Greer 2002; Marshall and Standifird 2005) and apparel (Elliott and 
Freeman 2003; Fichter and Sydow 2002), and likely in the future case of 
mining certification (MCEP 2006).  
 
The largest amount of research has been done in the field of forest 
certification. A recent set of systematic studies of forest certification in 
sixteen developing and transitioning countries found a host of effects on 
forest management and local governance institutions (Cashore et al 
2006). Most cases indicated that the adoption forest certification has led to 
improved environmental management practices in the industry, including 
better inventorying and planning, silvicultural practices, biodiversity 
protection, environmental monitoring, and training. In addition, certification 
has sometimes stimulated the introduction of entire new concepts, such as 
the Estonian ‘spring truce’, a time during which forestry is curtailed so as 
to avoid disturbing reproduction patterns of forest fauna. Forest 
certification has also led to improved labor conditions in many cases, 
ranging from the provision of protective clothing and shielded tools to 
better training and sanitary conditions.  
 
Equally importantly, the introduction of forest certification has led to 
various ‘network effects’ in local governance structures. In some countries 
with relatively closed governance structures the introduction of forest 
certification has led to the inclusion of previously excluded groups 
(typically environmental, labor and community groups) and seems also in 
some cases to have rebalanced power away from government officials 
and industry. The amount of change varies greatly among cases, 
however, and it is impossible to know at this stage how persistent these 
changes will be.  
 
To date, the effectiveness of certification programs in forestry as well as 
other sectors has depended heavily on the ability of activist regulatory 
entrepreneurs to use market chains to both pressure and monitor changes 
in forestry practices. Their capacity to do so is unlikely to continue 
indefinitely. Moreover, although perhaps to a lesser extent in the case of 
agriculture, global inequalities are an important part of program 
effectiveness. Thus, forest, apparel, and mining certification affect 
practices in developing countries because failure to achieve certification 
portends potentially serious losses of revenues from developed countries. 
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If international income inequalities decline over time, domestic demand for 
certified products in developing countries will have to rise to maintain 
market pressure and support for certification requirements, unless they 
have already been incorporated in a broader set of regulatory structures.  
 
The mechanisms of certification’s efficacy go well beyond market pressure 
and surveillance; it seems clear that they must operate through the 
general process of institutionalization, wherein changed practices become 
routine and taken-for-granted over time, ultimately shifting cultural 
understandings of appropriate behavior. While it is apparent from the 
general literature on institutionalization (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Colyvas and Powell, 2006) that this process is likely to occur, there has 
been little research to date documenting its dynamics in certification based 
regulatory systems. It seems reasonable to expect that insitutionalization 
will operate through a variety of pathways, including routine interactions 
within firms and among wood producers, processors, and buyers as well 
as changing assumptions in professional education. It will be important to 
try to understand how the tendency toward legalization – i.e., the formal 
expression of rights, duties and expectations together with the 
development of increasingly elaborate justificatory rationales and 
implementation institutions –affects institutionalization. The same goes for 
the effect of mutually reinforcing legal orders slowly bringing extra-
governmental orders into alignment with governmental ones. Ultimately, if 
some critics of ostensibly technocratic standard setting processes are 
correct, the effects should be visible as changes in the very identities of 
the participants in the regulatory systems (Wood 2004). 
 
Finally, to say that certification systems have significantly affected 
resource management and governance structures and that they are 
expanding and linking up with each other and with state systems is not to 
say that they are adequate to handle the problems they seek to address. 
Each of the certification centered regulatory systems discussed in this 
paper has been vehemently criticized as inadequate to the task at hand. 
Some critics even argue that they are counterproductive, since they may 
give the impression of offering solutions without the reality, thus diverting 
attention and resources from ‘real’ solutions (e.g., Latin 2005). These 
criticisms and the underlying questions they pose cannot be firmly 
answered at this stage, since the systems are still in formative stages and 
have not been carefully studied. Furthermore, the question of adequacy 
demands a referent – adequate in relation to what? And here there is a 
huge problem, because the perfect ‘hard’ regulatory systems do not exist 
and appear to have no prospect of coming into being in the near term. 
Even so, however, eventually this question will have to be addressed head 
on: has the turn toward certification based regulatory systems been an 
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effective move, or a fundamental mistake? Fortunately or unfortunately, 
that time has not yet arrived. Moreover, part of the answer will 
undoubtedly depend on questions beyond simple effectiveness.   
 
6. Broader Implications  
While the regulatory systems described in this paper employ conventional 
standard setting and certification techniques, they simultaneously 
constitute new institutional arrangements with potentially significant 
implications for law, society, and their changing relationship.  
Law 
The argument of this paper is that emerging certification-based regulatory 
systems entail a particular and somewhat novel kind of law making. Even 
prior to certification programs, the emergence of global markets typically 
generates legal pluralism on its own, since different parts of the expanded 
social space delimited by the market are subject to different territorially 
based legal regimes. At the same time, actors in one part of the market 
are both implicated and increasingly understood as having interests in 
actions in other parts, as the results of their transactions have effects 
there. Global certification programs are efforts by self-appointed non-state 
officials to bring these interests and effects into a common legal regime.  
 
Yet in the cases discussed above, the creation of one certification regime 
typically provokes establishment of at least one other, and often significant 
developments in state regulation as well, all of them with increasingly 
transnational reach. Thus, at any given point in the global market chains 
discussed above there are likely to be at least three operative legal orders, 
an NGO-oriented one, an industry-oriented one, and probably a state one 
as well.  
 
These orders are neither independent of each other nor static. Instead, 
they interact and compete, generating a larger governance structure and 
associated legal system that grow increasingly dense and yet unsettled at 
the same time, at least in the short run. To some extent, as discussed 
above, the competing systems may tend toward convergent standards 
and institutions, but the evidence for this proposition is not persuasive at 
this point. The case of organic agriculture, for example, suggests 
persistent and possibly expanding divergence among regimes, and this 
despite the pressures of expanding international trade for harmonization. 
Thus, at least in the near term, there is continued plurality and 
contestation. While there may be ‘more’ and more detailed law, and while 
it may permeate more social spaces, it is also deeply contingent and 
contested. So much so, that it seems likely to engage more and more 
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actors in each sector in the process of defining and redefining the rules, 
and to face them with repeated choices about which rules to 
accommodate.  
 
Just as the spread of certification may bring those who would traditionally 
have been low-level legal functionaries or addressees into active law 
making roles, so also it may turn those who would have been primarily 
lawmakers into legal entrepreneurs. The executive director of the FSC, for 
example, sees the FSC as fundamentally a change agent, rather than a 
certifier of good practice. To him the critical challenge facing the FSC is 
that of ‘finding new objectives for the future’ (Liedeker 2002). Leaders of 
industry based certification organizations portray their programs in similar 
ways. Virtually in unison, they talk about the importance of continuous 
improvement, expanding public participation, and building new 
relationships across constituencies. Law making as it has been described 
here is very much an entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Much work remains to be done in describing the dynamics of these 
emergent legal systems. As suggested above, it is possible that they 
represent a distinctive form of law, one in which competition and change 
have taken on new importance while stability and consistency have 
receded. The traditional legal forms of (1) defining rights and duties 
through rules (2) made through increasingly participatory, transparent, and 
regularized procedures (3) implemented by specialized officials and (4) 
justified in terms of normative principles are retained. Yet, change is built 
into the system through both traditional processes of legislation and 
adjudication and new ones of competition and contestation before a public 
that remains amorphous, segmented, and very much under construction.  
Society 
If the above depiction of emerging legal systems is at all accurate, it poses 
many important questions about what kind of society they will foster and 
support. One of the most obvious is the very definition of society. The 
Westphalian system of international law presumes national societies 
whose governments negotiate relationships with each other and 
promulgate international rules through treaties, conventions, mutually 
accepted customs, and the like. Clearly, however, global markets place 
pressure on that conception, since growing numbers of people are in more 
regular contact with ‘foreigners’ than with many people in their own 
countries, may have more in common with those foreigners, and often 
work out rules to organize their interactions without significant state 
involvement. Moreover, the vision of national societies has always been 
problematical in many states because they contain distinct communities 
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with different, often inconsistent legal traditions, most of which have been 
suppressed.  
 
Certification-based regulatory systems seem more sensitive to such 
differences than are traditional national and international legal systems. 
They appear to incorporate normative discourses such as human and 
community rights and environmental protection much more readily than 
the Westphalian system, and they officially value community protection 
and participation. Moreover, their very existence as alternative legal 
orders is a powerful indicator of the fact that people in the modern world 
participate in and negotiate their way through multiple legal communities.  
 
Yet certification-based regulatory systems may also have widespread 
homogenizing effects over time. Their competition to define common 
standards seems to have inherently centralizing tendencies. While it is 
also tempered by a competition to fit local circumstances, those local 
circumstances are for the most part filtered through ‘practical realities’ 
defined by the global economy. Pressures to accommodate the global 
market make many traditional modes of existence less feasible by the day, 
and certification systems seem to facilitate that trend, with their emphasis 
on standard methods of operation, management systems, audited 
accountability, and so on.  
 
The problem is not purely an anthropological one, however; the question 
is not simply whether traditional societies can be ‘preserved’. Rather, it is 
whether they can participate in global commerce in ways that sustain their 
capacity to define important terms of their own lives. If certification based 
regulatory systems are indeed sufficiently responsive to diverse 
communities to facilitate this process, they may help over time to construct 
a world society that both preserves spaces for distinctive communities and 
provides forums for interaction and negotiation among them.  
 
At present, transnational society is organized along several different lines, 
including economic sectors, states, and communities and peoples. The 
interaction among these contending organizational orders is disjointed at 
best. Whether one sees the emerging system as a heterarchy (e.g., 
Ehrenreich et al 1995) or a polyarchy (e.g., Dahl 2003; Cohen and Sabel 
2001) or something else, the nature of the interaction among the orders is 
amenable to many alternatives and carries many possible normative 
implications.  
 
Perhaps the most vexing normative implication is the thorny problem of 
democracy. The emerging regulatory systems are not representational in 
any traditional sense of the concept. Rather, they rely on various 
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procedural devices such as transparency, expanded participation, and 
reasoned explanation as substitutes, together with relatively open 
interactions among the plural social ordering structures noted above. The 
problem is, what kind of democracy, if any, is possible in these 
circumstances? The response up to this point seems to be a conceptual 
hodgepodge, with discursive and structural elements linking in multiple 
and shifting forms.  A particularly notable feature on the discursive side is 
the reliance by many certification programs on adumbrating concepts tied 
to what some commentators have described as ‘high moral authority’ 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Wapner 1995). Concepts such as human rights 
and ecosystem health provide powerful reference points that help to orient 
the systems, even as they remain subject to continuing elaboration and 
contestation through economic, governmental, and civil society ordering 
systems (e.g., Baxi 2005).  
 
Whether the emerging regulatory ensembles will learn to perform in ways 
that compose a global democracy will depend on simultaneous 
development of new theoretical and empirical understandings that inform 
and drive each other forward. Perhaps they will learn to implement new 
forms of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2000), and perhaps they will find 
areas of ‘overlapping consensus’ among peoples by settling on 
‘reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls 2001). Or perhaps they will converge 
around quite different governance structures that may or may qualify as 
‘government by the people’. No doubt we will engage in many debates on 
this question in years to come.  
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